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In the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah
SHERMAN S. DALTON
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and
GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY

Case No.
8943

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal arises from the Industrial Commission's
denial of plaintiff's claim for benefits under the W arkmen's Compensation Statutes of Utah. The claim arose
from an accident which happened on February 13,1955, at
approximately eight miles west of Evanston, Wyoming on
Highway 30S, when an automobile which plaintiff was
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driving went out of control on an icy portion of the road
and went off said road. Plaintiff was severely injured in
said accident.
There is no dispute as to the benefits which plaintiff
would be allowed were his claim approved. The sole issue
dealt with by the Industrial Commission and involved in
this appeal is whether or not plaintiff was an employee
of the Wayne Rasmussen Company under the Workmen's
Compensation laws of Utah.
The first hearing before the Industrial Commission
in this matter was held on October 17, 1956, before the
Honorable Robert J. Shaughnessy, Referee. .At the outset it was stated by the Referee (R. 11) :
"As a result of an off-the-record discussion,
the parties have stipulated that the sole issue to be
determined at this hearing is whether or not there
was a contract of employment existing between the
Defendant Wayne Rasmussen Company and the
.Applicant ShermanS. Dalton."
Pursuant to the foregoing, the hearing on October 17,
1956, dealt solely with evidence relating to the question of
whether or not the plaintiff was an employee at the time
of said accident. .As a matter of fact counRel for defendants objected to the plaintiff testifying as t:o his hospital
treatment and injuries for the reason that this hearing
was concerned only with the facts concerning plaintiff's
employment status (R. 22).
The evidence showed that Wayne Rasmussen Company at the time in question was a new and used car
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dealer in Ogden, Utah, having the franchise for Studebaker. The plaintiff had formerly been employed by this
company as a mechanic in the year 1952 and later when
the business was sold to Richard Baxter. At the time
the business was re-acquired by the Wayne Rasmussen
Company the plaintiff, together with John Porter, bought
the shop equipment and parts and leased the back part of
the Rasmussen Company building forming a partnership in the automobile repair and maintenance business.
The garage business of Dalton & Porter was separate and
apart from the business of the. Wayne Rasmussen Company. A great deal of the business of Dalton and Porter
consisted of servicing new and used cars sent to them by
the Wayne Rasmussen Company. It appeared that the
Wayne Rasmussen Company had to maintain a front of
appearing to own and operate a garage in connection with
its business for the purpose of being able to keep its franchise. However, the evidence showed that the two businesses were separate and distinct.
As a regular part of the Wayne Rasmussen Company business, it was necessary to purchase used cars
at some distance from Ogden, frequently in Wyoming and
Idaho, and to bring said cars back to Ogden for the purpose of re-sale. Prior to February 13, 1955 the said company had customarily used regular employees to proceed
to various places where used cars were purchased and to
drive these cars back to its place of business at Ogden.
Two regular employees by the names of A. J. Hansen and
Scotty Metheny were customarily used for this service
and sometimes Wayne Rasmussen himself would render
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such services (R. 46-47). Also sometimes Mr. Naylor,
who was in charge of buying and wholesaling used cars
for the Wayne Rasmussen Company, and Mr. Rasmussen
"would go out together and they would buy cars and other
times Mr. Naylor would go out, sometimes to New Mexico,
sometimes to Arizona, sometimes to Wyoming, and then
he would hire people to get these cars in." (R. 47).
On February 11, 1955, plaintiff was approached by
Mr. Naylor at his place of business and asked if he and his
partner could go to Rock Springs and bring two cars
in for the Wayne Rasmussen Company. At that time
Mr. Dalton informed Mr. Naylor that he would talk to
his partner and let him know. At the same time, Mr.
Naylor informed Mr. Dalton that this was an emergency
for the reason that they had no one else to pick up the
two cars. The following morning, February 12, a Saturday, at approximately between 9 :30 and 10 :00 A.M.,
plaintiff told Naylor that he and his partner would go,
and Naylor informed him that he would find out about the
bus and make arrangements. In regard to the remuneration to be paid for the services the plaintiff testified (R.
18):

"Q.
A.

Was anything said as to any remuneration
that you would receive for this trip~
Oh, he said he could pay $25.00 to get the
cars back here and that's all he could pay.

Q. And did he give you the $25.00 ~
A. Yes sir.
Q. And were you to get the bus tickets with that
money~
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A.

We bought the bus tickets out of that money,
yes.

Q.

And the $25.00 was for the two of

A.

For the two of us and the bus tickets."

you~

Shortly after the conversation aforesaid, Naylor informed plaintiff as to the time of departure of the bus
and gave him directions as to where to go after arriving
at Rock Springs to pick up the cars. He also instructed
plaintiff to fill the cars with gas and to charge the gas
to the Wayne Rasmussen Company. Furthermore, Naylor
informed Dalton that if they had any trouble on the
way to pay for it and bring the bill, that the money would
be refunded (R. 18). In this later conversation, Naylor
stated that he was very happy they could go, that some
people couldn't be depended upon to get the cars back.
Naylor gave dealers' plates to plaintiff and his partner
to use on the automobiles after they picked them up.
Plaintiff and his partner caught the bus from Ogden
at approximately between 2 and 3 p.m. on Saturday,
February 12, and arrived at Rock Springs at approximately 7 P.M. After arriving, they went to the place
where they had been directed to go, and the person they
were to see was waiting for them. They got in the cars
and signed the tickets for the gasoline that had been put
in said cars and then left, proceeding to a cafe for dinner.
After eating, they started for Ogden. Plaintiff believes
that at some point between Rock Springs and Evanston
the oil was checked in one of the two cars and a quart of
oil added. Plaintiff and his partner stopped in Evanston
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for a few minutes and had some coffee, then proceeded
towards Ogden to the point of the accident. The accident
happened at approximately 2 A.M. on February 13 (R.l).
Plaintiff further testified that the two bus tickets for
himself and his partner had cost between $4.00 and $5.00
(R. 41). The bookkeeper for Wayne Rasmussen Company, Mr. A. N. Purkey, witnessed part of the conversation in regard to the transaction aforesaid and also testified as to how such transactions were handled on the
books of the company. He stated that in such a transaction a check would be made out and charged to the
cost of the particular automobile which was being brought
back. He remembers that as a result of the conversation, arrangements were made for him to give them a
check for $25.00, the instructions being given by either
Mr. Naylor or Mr. Rasmussen. He then issued the check
and gave it to Mr. Dalton (R. 49-50). Mr. Purkey further
testified that regular employees on a salary and commission basis who performed the same service were paid
money in addition to their salary and that any additional
expenses incurred and which they paid out of their
pockets would be rein1bursed (R.. 51). Furthermore, Mr.
Purkey reme1nbers that a bill for gas and oil was found
in the pocket of plaintiff and that this bill was paid by
the Wayne Has1nussen Company (R. 52). At (R. 63)
Mr. Purkey testified as follows:

"Q. All of these ear transactions, deals like tllis,
were - Do I understand you right, that they
were all handled exactly the srune.
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A.

Yes. It made no difference whether Porter
and Dalton went after a car or Metheny and
Hansen, or any of the other employees. It
was so much plus expenses and that would be
added to the cost of the car."

In answer to questions by the referee the plaintiff
testified as follows (R. 42) :
"Q.

Just one or two questions, Mr. Dalton. Was
anything said about whether or not you should
account for this $25.00 after you returned~

A.

It was said that if we had any additional expense we would be reimbursed for it and anything we needed to charge to Wayne Rasmussen Company.

Q.

I see.

A.

And we'd be reimbursed for it.

Q.

So the $25.00 you received was for the bus
tickets and the balance was for you and Mr.
Porter personally1

A.

V\Tell, yes."

:Mr. Purkey also testified that in regard to such transactions as the one involved in this case, the payment to
the person involved was always a cash transaction and
was never handled by debits and credits (R. 61, 62).
Approximately one year after the hearing, the
referee rendered recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law which were adopted by the Industrial
Commission on October 9, 1957 (R. 71, 72). In said findings the referee stated in part as follows (R. 72):
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''The applicant and his partner were approached by Mr. Naylor, the sales manager of
the defendant, requesting the applicant and his
partner to go to Rock Springs, Wyoming, and
return with two cars for the defendant. The ap·plicant and his partner, Mr. Porter, agreed to go.
They were to receive $25.00 for the trip, out of
which would come the expense of two bus tickets
to Rock Springs. The defendant paid for all ga.:;
and oil and would reimburse the applicant for anv
·
money spent on repairs of the two cars.
"The applicant left on the bus according to
instructions given him by the defendant's agent.
arrived in Rock Springs that same evening, picked
up the cars according to the instructions, and on
the return trip on February 13, 1955 the applicant
lost control of the car as a result of icy roads and
the resultant crash caused his injuries.
"The principal issue is whether or not the
applicant was employed by the defendant. It appears to the Referee that the status of employment
must exist. The record shows that the above procedure was regularly followed by the defendant in
sending their full tunes salesn1an on such trips so
the type of work "''~as not casual or unusual for the
defendant. It could not be in the nature of a joint
venture since the applicant had no interest in the
propert~~ as the result of the sale. It appears that
his only interest \nls in returning with the cars
af' requested and taking as his wage the difference
behn•pn $1 ~.50 and the price of the bus tickets.
;\~f'mning $3.00 as the price of the bus ticket, the
applieant "\Ya.s earning at least $9.50 per day for
hif' work. ;'\< * *
.. It \Ya8 not unreasonable to find that the applicant was in fact an mnployee of the defendant
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on February 13, 1955, and that the accident on
the highway arose out of or in the course of his
employment."
Subsequent to this, on November 12, 1957, counsel
for defendant wrote a letter to Mr. Otto A. Wiesley,
Chairman of the Industrial Commission requesting a
re-hearing. Counsel requested the re-hearing to redetermine the question of whether or not there was a contract of employment existing between defendant and the
applicant. Also, counsel requested a re-hearing to determine if the medical expenses incurred by the applicant
were reasonable (R. 77). On November 26, 1957, the Industrial Commission granted the request for re-hearing
of defendants. Plaintiff resisted the granting of the rehearing and on December 5, 1957, the chairman of the
Industrial Commission sent a letter to counsel for plaintiff (R. 81). In this letter the chairman stated as follows:
"We acknowledge receipt of your Argument in
Opposition to Rehearing.
"We have read the transcript. There is no
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses.
As usual the order specifies reasonable medical
and l)_ospital expenses. Always these expenses
must be in line with our established fee schedule.
Therefore, usually, there is no dispute. In this
case a very large bill has been submitted to the
defendants. They are entvtled to have the commission determine thi's issue.
"The case will be set for rehearing early in
January."
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The rehearing was held on February 10,1958. At this
hearing the only proceedings held had to do with the introduction of medical bills. There was no further evidence
introduced regarding the employment question. However,
the defendants submitted a written argument which dealt
exclusively with the employment question (R. 101-110)
and plaintiff submitted a written argument in answer
to the one submitted by defendants (R. 11-119). On .April
2, 1958, the Industrial Commission rendered a decision
(R. 96). In this decision the Industrial Commission reversed its former holding and stated in part as follows:
"The $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner,
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages.
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Oberhansly vs. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P. 2d 1093,
5 Utah 2d 15 is controlling.
"We therefore find that applicant was not an
e1nployee of defendant, \Yayne Rasmussen Company on February 13, 1955, the date of the accident
. and injury, but that he ~vas either a volunteer or
an independent contractor.
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
application is denied."
The Plaintiff subn1itted a petition for rehearing on
April 23, 195S, (R. 97-100) which was denied by the Industrial Conunission on July 17, 1958 (R. 126).
Plaintiff is appealing frmn the arbitrary action taken
by the Industrial Connnission reversing its prior ruling
on plaintiff's elaim with no additional evidence having
been taken.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ll

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE REVERSAL OF ITS OWN FINDINGS BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AGAINST LAW.
POINT II.
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE
RE-HEARING WAS GRANTED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE REVERSAL OF ITS OWN FINDINGS BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AGAINST LAW.

It is well established law in Utah that the question of
whether or not an applicant is an employee is jurisdictional, and, therefore, the Supreme Court is required
to examine the evidence to see whether or not it preponderates against the conclusions of the Industrial
Commission. See Christean v. Industrial Commission,
(1948), 113 U. 451, 196 P.2d 502, and Sommerville v. Industrial Commiss~on (1948), 113 U. 504, 196 P.2 718.
The action taken by the Industrial Commission in
the case at bar strikes at the roots of the Workmen's
Compensation Laws and is violative of the general philosophy pertaining to said laws as stated by Justice Wolfe
in the case of Christean v. Industrial Commvssion, (1948),
supra, at page 517.
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"It may be pertinent here to repeat the now
familiar principle that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed to accomplish the beneficent purposes of the act. In close
or doubtful cases that construction should be applied which includes rather than excludes particular classes of employees from the benefits of the
act."
Certainly if the foregoing language is to be given
any meaning whatsoever in this State the action taken
by the Industrial Commission in the case at bar must be
disapproved. After having the case under advisement for
ahnost a year the referee made specific findings of fact
(1) that since the procedure involved in this case was
regularly followed by the defendant in sending out its
full time salesmen on such trips that the type of work
was not casual or unusual for the defendant; (2) that the
trip could not be in the nature of a joint venture since
the applicant had no interest in the property as the result
of the sale and, (3) that applicant and his partner were
paid a wage for the services which they performed which
consisted of $12.50 less the price of a bus ticket which
amounted to at least $9.50 per day for the work, with the
resulting conrlusion that the applicant was an employee
of defendant at the tiJ.ue of the accident. The Industrial
Commission then went on to grant a re-hearing in the
e:uw upon a request by counsel for defendants to redetermine the question of einploy""Inent without said coun~el stating any specific reason whatsoever. \Vithout taking any additional evidence at the re-hearing as to the
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question of employment the Industrial Commission arbitrarily changed its finding that the applicant was performing a service :for a wage to a finding that the $25.00
paid to applicant and his partner was expense money
rather than wages. The only justification that the Industrial Commission attempted for this arbitrary action
was that it asserted that the case at bar was on all fours
with the case of Oberhansley v. Travelers Insurance Company, 5 U. 2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093. It appears that the Industrial Commission changed a finding of fact on the
basis of the facts and law of an entirely different lawsuit.
The case at bar is entirely distinguishable from the
Oberhansley case. In the Oberhansley case the plaintiff
recovered a judgment from the owner of an automobile
business for injuries received when riding in a car driven
by said owner. The plaintiff then sued the insurance
company to collect on the owner's liability policy and the
insurance company contended that plaintiff was excluded
from the policy for the reason that he was an employee
under Workmen's Compensation Law. The plaintiff's
brother was a partner in this automobile business, and
the evidence showed that the business was in financial
difficulty. The plaintiff had delivered automobiles for
the company on other occasions, and it was admitted by
all parties involved that on the other occasions as well
as on the one in question the plaintiff was rendering a
service merely as a favor and a gratituity. Furthermore,
it was admitted by all parties that the $10.00 which the
plaintiff received was merely expense money and that it
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was understood as such. The trial Court held from this
evidence that there was no employee-employer relationship between the automobile company and the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the trial court
mainly on the basis that the trial court had held there was
no consideration paid to plaintiff for the service which
he rendered. The court appeared to rely on this fact as a
basis for affirrning the finding that the automobile company did not have the right to control the plaintiff in the
1nanner in which the work was accomplished. It was further pointed out that the plaintiff had a motive for desiring to perform the service as a favor for the reason
that his brother was a partner in the business and that the
business was in financial difficulty. The Oberhansley
case involved a situation where the Supreme Court held
that once having found that the service rendered was a
gratuit)~, it was reasonable for the trial court to hold
that the plaintiff was not an employee. The Industrial
Commission in the case at bar used the Oberhansley case
not as a precedent for a legal conclusion but as the basis
for reversing its 0\\~1 findings of fact that the plaintiff
had rendered the service not as gratuity but for a wage.

a

The evidence in the record in the case at bar establishes ovPrwhehuingl~~ the fact that the plaintiff and his
partner wPre perfornung the service involved for a wage
:md not as a gratuit~'· Not only did the parties involved
in the tran:-;adion in question testify that the only thing
tlmt. had to emnc out of the $25.00 was a bus ticket and
that any additional expenses would be reimbursed, but
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the bookkeeper testified. that in all transactions such as
this the person involved was given so much money plus
expenses. When questioned by counsel for defendants on
cross exan1ination the bookkeeper stated that the same
formula was used for regular employees performing
this service the same as it was used for Dalton and Porter. There was no evidence put in the record to contradict
in any way the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff and
his partner performed the service for the money that
would remain after the bus tickets were purchased. Any
other finding based on this record would have been utterly ridiculous. There was nothing whatsoever shown in
the case at bar indicating that plaintiff and his partner
had any motive for desiring to give defendant a gratituity
and for desiring to undertake an onerous burden of taking a bus trip to Rock Springs, Wyoming and spending
half the night driving back to Ogden over a weekend for
no remuneration. There was nothing shown in the record
that plaintiff had such a great love and devotion for the
Wayne Rasmussen Company that he would desire to
undergo such a hardship for no money at all. It seems
peculiar that the Industrial Commission would attribute
such a noble and generous motive to plaintiff for the
purpose of denying compensation, especially when there
was nothing in the record showing that plaintiff is such
a big hearted person.
The Industrial Commission in its final decision would
not even attempt to state definitely what it did consider
the plaintiff to be, but stated equivocally that he was
either a volunteer or an independent contractor. In its
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first ruling on this case the Industrial Commission held
that plaintiff was neither a volunteer nor an independent
contractor and appeared to rely heavily on the fact that
the procedure followed by plaintiff was a procedure regularly fo~lowed by defendant in sending out its full time
salesmen.
In arguing whether or not Wayne Rasmussen Company had the right of controlling plaintiff in the performance of this service it seems obvious that it had the same
right of control over plaintiff that it had over its full
time employees who performed similar services as an
integral part of its business. It would be very difficult
to hold that defendant had the right of control in one
case and not the other. It is difficult to see how anyone
could argue that the \Yayne Rasmussen Company did
not have the right to control the performance of the
services. The Wayne Rasmussen Company owned the
automobiles and gave plaintiff and his partner definite
instructions where to go, when to go, who to see, and to
drive the automobiles back to the Company after they
were obtained. Certainly the type of service which plaintiff was rendering was not one requiring an unusual degree of skill which is the case of 1nost independent contractors. Obviously the plaintiff and his partner had no
right to substitute anyone else for then1selves such as
uwst independent contractors have. It will be remembered that tlH• testinwn~· showed that \Vayne Rasmussen
Compan~· was relying on the reliability of plaintiff and
!1 is partner with which it was well acquainted. This was
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not the type of work which has no connection with the
business and which is usually done by outside parties, but
on the contrary was a regular and vital function of the
business of Wayne Rasmussen Company. It seems quite
obvious that an automobile dealer cannot function without
having automobiles to sell. The fact that the job which
Dalton and Porter were doing was one which was regularly and rnost usually performed by regular employees
for a wage should be determinative of the question of
employment, for it would be difficult to argue that had
one of the regular employees been injured as was Dalton
that he would not be considered an employee under Workmen's Compensation.
For assistance to the court the following cases are
cited to substantiate some of the legal propositions heretofore stated. See Ludlow v. Industrial Commission,
65 U. 168, 235 P. 884, and Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 77 U. 355, 296 P. 229, for the proposition that an
employee cannot put another person in his place without
the consent of the employer whereby an independent contractor can.
The applicant was held to be an employee and not an
independent contractor in the case of Southern Pacific
Company v. IndustriJal Commission, 71 U. 248, 264 P.
965, where the applicant was hired by the railroad company's section foreman to cut noxious weeds on a section
of the company's right of way in Weber County. The
applicant was to furnish his own team and mower and
was hired at a daily wage of $6.50. He was instructed
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where to cut the weeds and when to change to other
places. Also, it was pointed out that no one told applicant
how to operate the team and mower.
The case of Utah F~re Clay Company v. Industrial
Comm~ssion, 86 U. 1, 40 P. 2d 183, involved a situation
where the employer entered into an oral contract with
R. S. James to furnish trucks and drivers to do all of
his transportation and delivery service. James furnished
two trucks and drivers who reported daily to the shipping clerk of the company, and deliveries were made
under his direction. The court held in this case that the
truck drivers were employees of the company under the
\V orkmen's Compensation statutes. It seems difficult to
distinguish these latter two cases from the case at bar in
regard to the right of control test or any of the other
tests spoken of by the court in various cases.
Although it appears frmn the Industrial Commission's latest decision that no assertion was 1nade to the
effect that plaintiff was a casual employee as spoken of
in Section 35-1-43 Utah Code Ann. 1953, it seems advisable to discuss this aspect of the case briefl~~ due to the
fad that defendant has contended, an10ng other things,
t]w t plaintiff "~as such a casual en1ployee.
In t h0 ease of Palle Y. Industrval Commission of
[7tah, 7!) F. +7. 7 P. 2d :28+, it was pointed out that to
exeludP an f'Hlplo~~ee the emploYinent n1ust not only be
emmal hut n1ust also not be in the usual course of the
trad<' or bnsinPss of the e1nployer, and it was stated:
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"This, as it seems, but emphasizes the fact
that a casual or occasional employment of the
usual course of the trade or business of the employer does not exclude the employee."
And further:
"Further, the employment of Nelson to take
the place of Kenneth Jensen while absent, may not
be said to constitute a mere 'casual' employment,
but was a regular employment in the business. He
continued to be such an employee until he was
discharged or left the service."
It can be seen from this case that an employment, regardless of duration, if in the regular course of business cannot be a casual employment under the Workmen's Compensation statutes, and that any employment which accomplishes the work of a regular employee who is unable
to work is not a casual employment.
In Utah Copper Co. v. Industri'al Commission, 57 U.
118, 193 P. 24, the deceased was a farmer operating a
farm through which a canal ran. The water was used
for irrigation and stock and was owned by a canal company. However, Utah Copper Company used water from
the canal the year around in mining and milling processes.
The Utah Copper Company kept the canal clean and in
repair and frequently hired local men for repair work.
With the authority of the company the canal boss hired
the decedent for certain repair work in which work he
received his injury. It was held that obtaining water was
necessary to the business of the copper company and
anyone repairing the ditch was, therefore, engaged in the
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usual business of the employer and that, furthermore,
it was not casual employment. It was stated at page
29:
"The intent of the legislation in question was
to create a new or additional burden upon the
industries of this state not heretofore horne by
such industries, and to establish a system whereby
the industries should bear the cost qf providing for
those injured while engaged in such industries or
the dependents of those sustaining injuries resulting in death. Such being the object sought, it is,
in our judgment, more in consonance with that
purpose to conclude that it was not the intention
of the Legislature to exclude from the operation
of the act any one engaged in work necessarily
required in the usual prosecution of such industries, and that the duration of such employment or
the infrequency of the same ought not to control
the courts in determining whether the employment
was casual or otherwise. If the employment was
essential and was required in the prosecution of
the regular business of the industry, the industry,
in order to carry out and effectuate the purpose
of the act, should pay for any injuries sustained.
The statutes of this state require the courts to
give to legislative enactn1ents a liberal construction, with a ·vie"\v to effectuate the purpose sought
by the Legislature."
In t1w case of Capitol Cleaners and Dyers v. Industrial Commission. 85 {T. 295, 39 P. 2d 681, the defendant opPrated a. business of cleaning and dyeing of wearing
apparel, and decided for reasons being conducive to the
:weomplishment of its purposes and to pronwte its business to havf' a sn1okestack and certain radiators and pipes
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painted. The defendant hired the deceased to do it on an
hourly wage with tools and supplies furnished by the
company. In all respects except as to the actual mechanics of the painting the work was to be done under the
supervision and subject to the direction of the employer.
Furthermore, the deceased had done the same type of
work for the company before under similar arrangements.
It was held at page 682:
"The work to be accomplished being in furtherance of and necessary to the business in which
the company was engaged, the employment was
not casual within the meaning of R. S. Utah 1933,
42-1-41. Since the work was to have been done
under the supervision and subject to the direction
of the employer, Mr. Reusser, with respect thereto, was not an independent contractor within the
intent and meaning of R.S. Utah 1933, 42-1-40."
In regard to the general question of employeeindependent contractor, a recent case which may be of
assistance to the court is the case of Plewe Construction
Company v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 U. 375,
242 P. 2d 561. In this case a general contractor constructing a building hired partners to shingle the roof for so
much a square. The contractor instructed the partners
as to how the work was to be done, furnished the material
and supervised the work. The partners hired a carpenter
to help them, and the carpenter was injured in this work.
It was held that the carpenter was the employee of the
contractor under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
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It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reversing
former findings of fact based on the entire evidence in
the record on the sole ground of the Oberhansley case
which has an entirely distinguishable fact situation as
heretofore pointed out.
POINT II.
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEEDED THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE
RE-HEARING WAS GRANTED.

As pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein it
was agreed between the parties and the referee at the
time of the first hearing that the hearing would be devoted exclusively to the question of whether or not the
plaintiff was an employee. It was agreed at that time that
there would probably be no dispute as to the medical bills
and wage benefits should plaintiff receive an award.
As previously stated, subsequent to the first decision
of the Industrial Cmn1nission granting benefits to plaintiff, counsel for defendants sent an ex parte letter to Otto
A. "'\Viesley, the chainnan of the Industrial Connnission,
in which he requested a re-hearing to re-determine
'vhether or not there was a contract of employment existing between the defendant "'\Yayne R.as1nussen Company
and the applicant, Shennan S. Dalton, at the tin1e of the
inju r)· and also to deternrine if the n1edical expenses ineuiTed hr the applicant were reasonable. When the Industrial Cmnmission granted the re-hearing, counsel for
1)laintiff objected for the reason he had been given no
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notice and had not been given an opportunity to submit
an argument opposing the granting of the re-hearing and
had been denied due process of law (R. 75). Subsequently, counsel for plaintiff also submitted an argument in
opposition to the re-hearing on the two grounds as stated
in the letter of counsel for defendant and especially in
regard to the employment question, for the reason that
the matter had been thoroughly studied by the referee
for almost a year before the decision was rendered (R.
79-80).

In response to this argument in opposition of rehearing, counsel for plaintiff received a letter dated December 5, 1957, from the Industrial Commission of Utah
and signed by its chairman, Otto A. Wiesley. This letter
stated as follows:
"We acknowledge receipt of your Argument
in Opposition to Re-hearing.
"We have read the transcript. There is no
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses.
As usual the order specifies reasonable medical
and hospital expenses. Always these expense8
must be in line with our established fee schedule.
Therefore, usually, there is no dispute. In this
case a very large bill has been submitted to the
defendants. They are entitled to have the conlmission determine this issue.

'

"The case will be set for rehearing early in
January."
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Certainly, even a casual reading of this letter shows
that the Industrial Commission was informing counsel
that the re-hearing was granted for the sole purpose of
establishing the reasonableness of the medical bills. As
previously stated, the re-hearing was subsequently held
and was limited to evidence as to the reasonableness of
the medical bills. The Industrial Commission then proceeded in its subsequent decision to arbitrarily reverse its
former findings of fact and decision without having taken
any new evidence whatsoever and after having the original hearing under advisement for almost a year.
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Commission granted the re-hearing for the sole purpose of
considering the reasonableness of the medical bills. The
Industrial Conunission had no jurisdiction to then re-open
the question of einploJinent which had been finally and
definitey decided.
It is respectfully subinitted that to allo"W the Indnst rial Conunission to grant a re-hearing for certain pnrpo~('~ and then allow said Conunission to open up the
n'-hearing- and reconsider other 1natters would be grossly
unfair to litigants and would gi,~e the Industrial ComJllission unlilllit!)d p!nn:r to ad arbitrarily and capricious}~· as it did in the case ~l t bar. Certaini~~. the rules of
pro<'!'dure should be definite and certain so that appli<'ants and their :1ttorne~·s Ina~- rely on final decisions
Iliad<' hy the Industrial Counnission and not be subject
to having tht> rug pulled out frmn under the~n.
I
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CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission has the· duty to admin-

'I

~I ~

ister the Workmen's Compensation Laws fairly to effectuate the "beneficent purposes of the Act." The only
protection a claimant has against arbitrary and capricious action of the Industrial Commission is an appeal
to this Court. This Court is urged to intervene when
the Commission attempts to become a law unto itself.
When the Industrial Commission attempts to establish
its own empire and its own law contrary to the beneficent
purpose of the Act, its actions should he stricken down.
Such arbitrary, highhanded and illegal treatment
as plaintiff received at the hands of the Industrial Commission should not be tolerated. After taking a full year
to arrive at a decision awarding compensation to plaintiff, the Commission suddenly, arbitrarily and illegally
reversed itself and took away plaintiff's rightful award.
This action was taken without new evidence or new law
but solely on the basis of the peculiar facts of a different
lawsuit. The Commission even exceeded its own stated
purpose in granting the rehearing by considering the em-

pr:

ployment question. This question had been finally determined and the rehearing for such question denied. The
Commission had lost jurisdiction of the question of employment and had no power to arbitrarily open it up
again and reverse former findings.
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It is respectfully submitted that the action taken by
the Industrial Commission in this case should be stricken
down and plaintiff given his rightful award.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
Attorney for Plaintiff
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